Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem? by Blanco, Mariana et al.
IZA DP No. 3517
Belief Elicitation in Experiments:





























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
May 2008 
Belief Elicitation in Experiments: 




Royal Holloway, University of London  
 
Dirk Engelmann 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
Alexander K. Koch 




Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
 







P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  






Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem?
*
 
Belief elicitation in economics experiments usually relies on paying subjects according to the 
accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments for other decisions. Such incentives, 
however, allow risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse 
outcomes of other decisions in the experiment. This raises two questions: (i) can we trust the 
existing belief elicitation results, (ii) can we avoid potential hedging confounds? Our results 
instill confidence regarding both issues. We propose an experimental design that eliminates 
hedging opportunities, and use this to test for the empirical relevance of hedging effects in 
the lab. We find no evidence for hedging, comparing the standard “hedging-prone” belief 
elicitation treatment to a “hedging-proof” design in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game. 
Our findings are strengthened by the absence of hedging even in an additional non-belief 
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Beliefs are at the heart of the analysis of any game with strategic interaction, and behavioral models
suggest intricate ways in which beliefs may come about and evolve based on introspection and past
experience. Experimental economists therefore often seek to measure subjects’ beliefs.
Such belief elicitation is usually incentivized, following the standard practice in experimental
economics of paying subjects according to their decisions. Hence, the closer a subject’s stated
beliefs are to the actual distribution of actions and events, the higher his or her payoﬀ.
This design feature, however, changes the game of interest. In the theoretical version of the game,
beliefs only indirectly aﬀect payoﬀs through their impact on the actions taken by players. Under
incentivized belief elicitation, stated beliefs themselves become part of the payoﬀ-relevant action
space. Often this creates an opportunity for using stated beliefs to hedge against adverse outcomes
in the rest of the experiment. For example, a risk-averse subject may take an action in line with her
true optimistic beliefs, but then falsely state pessimistic beliefs to insure against the risk of having
taken an action leading to low payoﬀs ex post. Not only might the stated beliefs deviate from the
true beliefs, if subjects use them to hedge, but decisions might be biased because hedging allows
subjects to choose a riskier action. As a result, neither the observed actions in an experiment nor
the stated beliefs may accurately reﬂect the true preferences and beliefs of the subjects relevant for
the underlying theoretical game.
This raises two questions: (i) can we trust the existing belief elicitation results, and (ii) can we
avoid potential hedging confounds without generating new problems? Our paper addresses these
questions as follows. First, we show how one can eliminate hedging opportunities with a simple
twist in the experimental design. Second, we test for the empirical relevance of hedging eﬀects in
the lab, by comparing a “hedging-proof” design to a standard “hedging-prone” belief elicitation
treatment in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game. Third, to strengthen our results we run an
additional treatment that uses a ﬁnancial investment frame, where hedging arguably would be most
natural. Subjects here complete an individual decision problem that is designed to mirror the payoﬀ
structure of the hedging-prone belief elicitation treatment.
How can we avoid potential hedging confounds? The common procedure in belief elicitation
experiments is that subjects receive payment for both their action choices in the actual game un-
derlying the experiment and for the accuracy of their stated beliefs. The following change makes
the design hedging proof: randomly pay either the payoﬀ associated to the game outcome or for
the accuracy of subjects’ stated beliefs. This is similar to procedures commonly used in lottery
1choice experiments, where one lottery task is randomly selected to be relevant for payoﬀs (e.g., Holt
1986a, Beattie and Loomes 1997), but it has not been previously recognized to be a solution for the
hedging problem.1
To address the question whether we can trust the existing belief elicitation results, we test for
the empirical relevance of hedging eﬀects in the lab by comparing a standard hedging-prone belief
elicitation treatment to its hedging-proof counterpart. As a simple game is required where beliefs are
relevant, we use a one-shot sequential prisoners’ dilemma setting. Participants ﬁrst make second-
mover decisions for the case in which the ﬁrst player cooperates. They are then asked for their
beliefs regarding second-mover choices of the other players in their session. Finally, they make their
ﬁrst-mover choice. In the hedging-prone belief elicitation treatment, subjects can insure against
the risk that they are exposed to when cooperating as a ﬁrst mover by stating pessimistic beliefs
about the second-mover choices of the other players. The hedging-proof treatment eliminates the
opportunity to insure against this risk by randomly selecting, at the end of the experiment, whether
the belief task or the action choices are the basis for payments.
To preview our main ﬁndings, the comparison between the two treatments shows no evidence
for hedging. Subjects who use the hedging opportunity in the hedging-prone treatment should take
riskier choices in the prisoner’s dilemma or, provided they choose to cooperate as ﬁrst mover, state
less optimistic beliefs (that is, indicate a smaller probability that second movers will cooperate). In
our data, we ﬁnd no evidence for either of these eﬀects.
The sequential prisoners’ dilemma belief elicitation treatments use a neutral frame. As a robust-
ness test, we therefore run an additional non-belief elicitation treatment with a ﬁnancial investment
decision frame, where arguably hedging should be most natural. It involves two simple individual
decision tasks with payoﬀs that mirror those of the sequential prisoners’ dilemma, and oﬀers a
similar hedging opportunity to the one in the hedging-prone belief elicitation treatment. Again we
ﬁnd no evidence for hedging. This strengthens the earlier results that experimental subjects do not
appear to make use of hedging opportunities. Overall, our ﬁndings thus suggest that hedging bias
is not a serious concern in belief elicitation experiments and thus reassures conﬁdence in existing
experiments that could be aﬀected by a hedging bias.
We discuss the related literature in Section 2. The experimental design, procedures and results
1Instead, researchers have addressed the hedging problem in the following ways. Some have simply ignored it, some
have chosen not to pay the subjects for stating beliefs. Most commonly, researchers have chosen the incentives for the
belief task to be “small” relative to the incentives regarding decisions in the game. We will discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of these procedures in detail below.
2of the belief elicitation experiments are presented in Section 3 and those of the ﬁnancial investment
frame experiment in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. Instructions for the experiments are
in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
We start our review of the related literature with general issues about belief elicitation. Then we
deal with the hedging problem created by belief elicitation methods.
Does belief elicitation change the observed behavior that researchers seek to analyze? One
conjecture is that subjects always form beliefs as part of making their choices—therefore asking
them to state beliefs should not inﬂuence behavior. Evidence on this is mixed2 and partly depends
on whether or not the belief elicitation part is incentivized. Asking subjects to state beliefs without
payoﬀ consequences makes them more likely to play dominant strategies in Croson’s (2000) prisoner’s
dilemma game, and less receptive to payoﬀ diﬀerences in Erev, Bornstein, and Wallsten’s (1993)
public-good game. However, other experiments produce no signiﬁcant behavioral diﬀerences in
public-good games (G¨ achter and Renner 2006) and asymmetric 2x2 games with a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium (Rutstr¨ om and Wilcox 1996).
A fundamental principle in experimental economics is to pay subjects contingent on their choices.3
Empirically, the move from hypothetical choices to incentivized choices tends to have a stronger
eﬀect than increasing the stake size (see, e.g., the surveys by Smith and Walker 1993, Beattie and
Loomes 1997, and Camerer and Hogarth 1999). Related to belief elicitation, the generally held view
is that such incentives reduce the amount of “noise” in the beliefs data. For this there is both direct
evidence (G¨ achter and Renner 2006) and indirect evidence (from survey responses in Oﬀerman,
Sonnemans, and Schram 1996, p. 827). G¨ achter and Renner (2006) and Croson (2000) document
signiﬁcant changes in subjects’ behavior relative to treatments with no belief questions when stated
beliefs are rewarded based on how closely they match other subjects’ actual play. Rutstr¨ om and
Wilcox (1996) ﬁnd an eﬀect only for players with strong payoﬀ asymmetries between strategies.
However, Wilcox and Feltovich (2000) cannot replicate Croson’s (2000) ﬁndings, and several other
2Bhatt and Camerer’s (2005) brain-imaging experiments suggest that making choices and forming beliefs within
the same game involve substantially diﬀerent processes. Interestingly, the areas activated in the brain do overlap for
both tasks when subjects’ choices and beliefs are in equilibrium (23% of all trials), that is, beliefs about what other
subjects will do are accurate and actions are best responses to own beliefs.
3Other social sciences – most notably psychology – do not regularly use incentives in experiments (for a method-
ological discussion see, e.g., Hertwig and Ortmann 2001).
3experimental studies report no signiﬁcant behavioral changes (Nyarko and Schotter 2002, Guerra
and Zizzo 2004, Costa-Gomes and Weizs¨ acker forthcoming).
A more subtle question is if it matters how beliefs are elicited. The most heavily used technique
for incentivized belief elicitation is the quadratic scoring rule (e.g., Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer
1985, Holt 1986b, Selten 1998, Huck and Weizs¨ acker 2002, Oﬀerman et al. 2007). A voluminous
literature in statistics investigates the theoretical conditions for truthful elicitation of probability
beliefs, that is, addresses incentive compatibility within belief elicitation tasks (e.g., Murphy and
Winkler 1970, Savage 1971, Allen 1987). Hurley and Shogren (2005) test experimentally whether
an induced probability can indeed be recovered using elicitation mechanisms.4 An alternative belief
elicitation method is to reward only a perfect prediction, thus asking for the mode of the beliefs
(e.g., Wilcox and Feltovich 2000, Bhatt and Camerer 2005).
We now turn to the central issue of this paper, the hedging opportunities created by belief elic-
itation methods. Experimenters usually simply augment choice tasks with an incentivized belief
elicitation task. A problem with this is that subjects have a stake in the events about which subjec-
tive probabilities are elicited.5 This often creates cross-task hedging opportunities that compromise
the between task incentive compatibility of belief elicitation mechanisms.A risk-averse subject may
misreport stated beliefs to insure against the event that the choice based on the true beliefs leads
to a low payoﬀ realization in the choice task, and vice versa. Put diﬀerently, when making a risky
choice, the variance of the total payoﬀs earned from both the choice and the belief tasks can be
reduced by stating pessimistic beliefs about the outcome.
How have experimenters dealt with the hedging problem? A simple solution is not to pay
the belief elicitation part at all. This eﬀectively eliminates the hedging problem, but then calls
into question whether we can trust stated beliefs. As discussed above, monetary incentives in
experiments do appear to matter and this has also been shown for belief elicitation tasks. A
4They report that stated beliefs overestimate low and underestimate high probabilities, similar to ﬁndings in
calibration studies (e.g., Slovic, Fischhoﬀ, and Lichtenstein 1977) and the judgement and biases literature in cognitive
psychology (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Gilovich, Griﬃn, and Kahneman 2002).
5In general, such stakes include any aspects of the predicted events that inﬂuence a subject’s evaluation of the
payoﬀs. Karni (1999) gives the example of a surgeon concerned about his reputation when voicing an opinion regarding
the likely outcome of an operation. Theoretically, such stakes make truthful elicitation of beliefs impossible (Karni
and Safra 1995). Oﬀerman, Sonnemans, and Schram (1996) test in an experiment (where hedging is not an issue)
for one such “stake” eﬀect, namely whether subjects report beliefs biased to justify their own action. They compare
stated beliefs of players compensated both for belief and choice tasks with those of “spectators”, who only state beliefs,
ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
4frequently chosen design to address the hedging problem is to keep the stakes for belief elicitation
“small” relative to other choice tasks.6 This procedure may reduce the possible hedging bias, but
it cannot remove the problem entirely. Moreover, paying “small” incentives for stating beliefs is at
odds with Smith’s (1982) precept that incentives should be salient. Another alternative is not to
elicit beliefs and estimate beliefs based on observed actions of players and a structural econometric
model. The structural estimates, however, pose identiﬁcation problems (e.g., Manski 2004) and
may yield belief measures that are substantially diﬀerent from what stated beliefs would be (e.g.,
Nyarko and Schotter 2002). We conclude that none of these procedures satisfactorily deal with the
hedging problem, as they all create new problems or biases.
Our “hedging-proof” experimental design oﬀers a very simple way of eliminating hedging oppor-
tunities, by randomly paying either the payoﬀ from playing the game or for the accuracy of stated
beliefs. This design is similar to what is known as “random lottery selection procedure” (Holt 1986a)
or “random problem selection procedure” (Beattie and Loomes 1997) in lottery choice experiments.
To keep overall incentives per task the same in expected terms as in the “hedging-prone” treatment
one can simply adjust the exchange rate (as we do in our experiments).7 Even though the method to
pay for only one randomly selected choice among several choices is well-tested, it has not previously
been recognized that this method can also be used in belief elicitation experiments to eliminate the
hedging problem. Berninghaus et al. (2006) use a similar design for belief elicitation but do not
address the hedging problem. Instead, they are interested in whether subjects report beliefs biased
to justify their own action, similar to the question that Oﬀerman, Sonnemans, and Schram (1996)
address with their “spectator” treatment (see footnote 5).
We are aware of only two studies that have explicitly explored hedging biases in stated beliefs.
Both Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Costa-Gomes and Weizs¨ acker (forthcoming) conjecture, based
on indirect evidence from their experiments, that there is not a perceivable hedging bias. Our
experiments oﬀer direct evidence on this, being the ﬁrst to compare in an experiment a hedging-
proof design to its standard hedging-prone counterpart.
6The following quote from Rutstr¨ om and Wilcox (1996, p. 11) nicely summarizes the idea used in many papers:
“The maximum payoﬀ for each stated belief [...] is deliberately low to make belief statements less interesting in
expected payoﬀ terms than strategy choice itself, which is typical of designs like this using a scoring rule.”
7In any case, reduced stake sizes in expected terms do not appear to matter in lottery experiments. In their survey
Beattie and Loomes (1997) report no signiﬁcant “dilution eﬀect”. See also Starmer and Sugden (1991).
53 Belief-elicitation Experiments
3.1 Design
Our design is based on the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game in Figure 1.8 There are two players,
the ﬁrst mover (FM) and the second mover (SM), who each have to choose whether to cooperate
or defect (ak ∈ {c,d},k ∈ {FM,SM}). If aFM = d, the game ends with a payoﬀ of 10 for both FM
and SM.9 If aFM = c, the payoﬀ depends on the action of SM. Following aSM = c, payoﬀs are 14
for both FM and SM; following aSM = d, the payoﬀ is 7 for FM and 17 for SM. The experiments
use a neutral frame.10
Clearly, a rational and selﬁsh SM will always defect. There are, however, many reasons why
a SM might cooperate, among which are, for example, inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), reciprocity (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and
Fischbacher 2006), total surplus considerations (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and
Strobel 2004), or simply decision errors. A FM’s decision whether to cooperate or defect is therefore
not trivial, but depends on her belief µ about the probability that she is matched with a SM who
cooperates. In the game in Figure 1, aFM = c is a best response for a risk-neutral rational and
selﬁsh FM if and only if µ ≥ 3/7 ≈ 43 percent.
Our belief elicitation experiments implement the above game and have a common core structure.
Each session consists of ten subjects, who all complete the following sequence of tasks only once
and without receiving any feedback in between tasks.
8The sequential prisoners’ dilemma has been studied in experiments by Clark and Sefton (2001) and Blanco,
Engelmann, and Normann (2007). It shares the fundamental property with the trust or investment game (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995) and the gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993) that Pareto gains are
possible, but that initiating the trade exposes the ﬁrst mover to risk. In our game, there are eﬃciency gains (in the
sense of increases in total payoﬀ) from cooperation both at the ﬁrst stage and at the second stage. The investment
game has eﬃciency gains only at the ﬁrst stage (the pie size does not increase further if the second-mover returns
money), whereas the gift-exchange game (as some “trust games” in the literature) only has eﬃciency gains at the
second stage.
9In their sequential prisoner’s dilemma experiments, Clark and Sefton (2001) and Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann
(2007) ﬁnd that 96 percent and 94 percent, respectively, of the second movers defect when the ﬁrst mover defects.
Given this near unanimity, we dropped this decision to simplify the experiment and implement payoﬀs as if the second
mover defects after ﬁrst-mover defection. The second-mover decision is thus conditional on the ﬁrst mover choosing
to cooperate.
10We relabeled players and actions as follows: FM=A player, SM=B player, FM cooperate=IN, FM defect=OUT,




















SM payoff: πSM(aFM, aSM)
Figure 1: Sequential prisoner’s dilemma game
1. SM decision task. Each subject makes a choice in the role of SM, for the case that FM chose
to cooperate: aSM
i ∈ {c,d}.
2. Guess task. Each subject is then asked to guess how many of the nine other subjects in the
lab chose to cooperate in the role of SM: gi ∈ {0,1,...,9}.
3. FM decision task. Finally, each subject makes a choice in the role of FM: aFM
i ∈ {c,d}.
With this procedure, participants make their choices before they know whether they have the
role of FM or SM. In other words, we employ the so called strategy method. We ask participants
to start with making the SM choice and then elicit beliefs about the other subjects’ SM choices.
This makes sure that participants understand well the decision problem of the other players, about
which they are making a belief statement.
Based on the proﬁles of choices by the ten subjects in a session, {aFM
i ,aSM
i ,gi}i=1,...,10, two kinds
of payoﬀs in experimental currency units (ECU) are computed, the decision task payoﬀ and the
guess task payoﬀ:
Decision task payoﬀ. The computer randomly matches all subjects in pairs. In each subject
pair, one subject (say i) is randomly assigned the FM role and the other (say j) the SM role, so
7True numbera
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
9 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9 3.1 0.0
8 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9 3.1
7 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9
6 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3
Guessb 5 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4
4 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0
3 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3
2 5.9 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3
1 3.1 5.9 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8
0 0.0 3.1 5.9 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0
Notes:
a the true number of the nine other subjects choosing a
SM = c;
b the stated belief about the number
of the nine other subjects choosing a
SM = c. Payoﬀs are based on the quadratic scoring rule in (1).
Table 1: Payoﬀ table for the guess task (payment in experimental currency units).
that subject i’s decision task payoﬀ is δi = πFM(aFM
i ,aSM
j ) and subject j’s decision task payoﬀ is
δj = πSM(aFM
i ,aSM
j ), as shown in Figure 1.
Guess task payoﬀ. As is common in belief elicitation tasks, we implement a quadratic scoring
rule and present it to subjects in the form of a payoﬀ table (see Table 1). The guess task payoﬀ
γi depends on the accuracy of a subject’s guess gi about the true number ti of the nine other
participants in the room who have chosen to cooperate in the previous SM decision task:








where the scale parameter for adjusting the monetary payoﬀs is set to 15 in order to ensure that
the guess and decision task payoﬀs are of comparable magnitude.
We have two belief-elicitation treatments. Our baseline (“hedging-prone”) treatment Hedge
implements the procedure frequently used in belief-elicitation experiments, to base pay both on
action choices and on the accuracy of stated beliefs. Each subject receives as ﬁnal payoﬀ the sum
of decision task payoﬀ δi and guess task payoﬀ γi. As we will explain below, this may bias stated
beliefs because of cross-task hedging.
8Treatment Final payoﬀ Exchange rate
Hedge decision task δi and guess task γi ECU 1 = £0.5
NoHedge either decision task δi or guess task γi (equally likely) ECU 1 = £1
Table 2: Treatments for belief elicitation experiments.
Our (“hedging-proof”) treatment NoHedge eliminates the cross-task hedging opportunity by
basing pay either on the decision tasks or on the guess task. At the end of the experiment, a
random draw decides whether the ﬁnal payoﬀ will be the decision task payoﬀ δi or the guess task
payoﬀ γi. To keep incentives in each task the same across treatments in expected terms (and also to
keep the total expected payoﬀ comparable to Hedge), the exchange rate was doubled in treatment
NoHedge (see Section 3.2). Table 2 summarizes the belief elicitation treatments.
Treatment Hedge gives subjects the opportunity to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse
outcomes of the decision task. How a subject responds to her expectations about the other players’
actions aﬀects the correlation between her decision task payoﬀ and her guess task payoﬀ. The higher
the stated belief in the guess task, the higher the correlation of payoﬀs between the guess and the
decision tasks is for those who choose to cooperate as FM. In other words, a subject who states that
more than half of the second movers cooperate and plays the best response to this stated belief will
tend to have a high payoﬀ in both tasks if many of the nine other players indeed cooperate as SM,
and a low payoﬀ in both tasks if many defect. The subject can, however, reduce the variance of her
total payoﬀ (at the expense of her total expected payoﬀ) by understating in the guess task her true
beliefs. This allows her to bring down or even reverse the correlation between the task payoﬀs. Still
her payoﬀ from FM cooperation will tend to be low if there are few cooperating second movers in
the session. But the payoﬀ from the guess task will then be higher because she stated beliefs that
are more pessimistic than her true beliefs.
To address our question whether the presence of such a cross-task hedging opportunity biases
stated beliefs, we compare behavior in Hedge with that in NoHedge. Because either the decision
tasks or the guess task will be the basis for payments in NoHedge, there is no cross-task hedging
beneﬁt from stating a pessimistic belief when choosing to cooperate as ﬁrst mover. Hedge, in
contrast, allows to use stated beliefs to reduce the risk of cooperating as FM. If there is hedging in
Hedge we should therefore observe one or both of the following two patterns:
i) There are more FM cooperators in Hedge than in NoHedge.
Risk-averse players who do not hold suﬃciently optimistic beliefs to make FM cooperation
9their best response without the cross-task hedging opportunity might prefer to cooperate as
FM when given this opportunity.
ii) Among the FM cooperators, the stated beliefs are lower in Hedge than in NoHedge.
Risk-averse players can reduce the risk from cooperating as FM by stating less optimistic beliefs.
A strong indication of this would be if the number of subjects who cooperated as FM, even
though the risk-neutral best response to their stated beliefs would be to defect, was higher in
Hedge than in NoHedge. In NoHedge only decision errors or risk seeking behavior could explain
this, while hedging provides an additional reason in Hedge.
The comparison with NoHedge allows us to assess whether subjects hedge across tasks in Hedge
without having to measure their risk preferences.11 A precise and stable measure of risk preferences
would be necessary if we wanted to gauge whether subjects hedge based on the data in Hedge
alone. For example, a participant who chooses to cooperate as FM, but states a belief that four
among the other nine participants cooperate as SM, could be risk averse and hedging, or could
be a risk neutral (or risk seeking) player stating her true belief. Without knowing this subject’s
risk preferences, there is no way of deciding whether she is hedging or not. The advantage of
our design is that we can decide whether subjects are hedging or not by comparing the data across
treatments. In Hedge the ﬁrst type of players (who hedge) would behave in a systematically diﬀerent
way than in NoHedge, whereas the second type of players (who do not hedge) would not, leading
to the above predictions. An additional advantage of using the comparison treatment NoHedge
is that this permits controlling for potential inﬂuences of risk aversion on stated beliefs within a
treatment. This issue is well known; for example, the quadratic scoring rule provides incentives for
risk-averse players to state less extreme beliefs than their true beliefs (e.g., Oﬀerman et al. 2007).
Our treatment comparison nets out these eﬀects, which are not related to our research question,
because within-task risk reduction opportunities aﬀect both our treatments in the same way, while
cross-task hedging can occur only in Hedge.
11Measuring risk preferences may not be conclusive because the stability of risk preferences across diﬀerent
tasks is not guaranteed. For example, Isaac and James (2000) elicit risk preferences in an auction and a
Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism with the same subjects. But they do not ﬁnd within-subject stability of
preferences across the two institutions. See also Friedman and Sunder (2004) and Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(2005).
103.2 Procedures
The experiments were carried out in the Experimental Lab of Royal Holloway, University of London,
using the experimental software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants were students from various
subjects, recruited through online and on-campus advertisements.
For the Hedge and NoHedge treatments, we conducted six sessions with ten participants each,
providing us with thirty independent observations for those two treatments. (Because subjects make
all decisions before receiving any feedback, each individual counts as an independent observation.)
Thus, in total, 60 subjects participated in our belief-elicitation experiments.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to separate cubicles and given
time to read through the instructions.12 Any questions were answered privately. The experiment on
the computer was only started after all subjects had successfully answered a control questionnaire,
requiring them to calculate simple examples on how actions determine payoﬀs and checking that
they had understood how the ﬁnal payout is determined. Prior to each task there was a short
oral summary, which was delivered by the same experimenter in all sessions. At the end of the
experiment, the ﬁnal payout in experimental currency units (ECU) was converted into Pounds
Sterling at an exchange rate of £0.5 per ECU (Hedge) and £1 per ECU (NoHedge), respectively.
Sessions lasted for roughly 45 minutes with average earnings of £12.72 (Hedge: £12.68, NoHedge:
£12.76).
3.3 Results
Before we focus on the hedging issue, we brieﬂy summarize the main results of the experiments.
Table 3 reports separately for our two treatments how many subjects cooperate/defect as FM/SM in
each of the four cells (aFM = aSM = c, aFM = aSM = d, aFM = c∧aSM = d, aFM = d∧aSM = c).
For each cell the table also reports in italics the average stated belief (of how many of the other
nine participants in the session choose aSM = c).
In both treatments, roughly half of the subjects cooperate as FM, and roughly half of them also
cooperate as SM. The diﬀerences between treatments are negligible. Most subjects (27 of 30 in
Hedge and 23 of 30 in NoHedge) make FM choices consistent with risk-neutral payoﬀ maximization,
given their stated belief and assuming standard selﬁsh preferences. A moderate amount of risk
aversion can explain the choices of all the remaining subjects. SM decisions are highly correlated
with beliefs, which is consistent with a consensus eﬀect. The term consensus eﬀect describes the
12Instructions and the oral summaries mentioned below are in the appendix.
11Hedge NoHedge
FM FM
cooperate defect Σ cooperate defect Σ
# observations 13 2 15 14 3 17
SM cooperate
average beliefs 6.5 5.5 6.6 3.0
# observations 3 12 15 3 10 13
SM defect
average beliefs 4.3 2.2 4.3 2.6
Σ 16 14 17 13
Table 3: Results from treatments Hedge and NoHedge.
frequently made observation that experimental subjects tend to believe that others will behave
similarly to themselves, e.g., facing a choice between two options A and B, those who choose A
expect a higher rate of choices for A than those who choose B.13
We now turn to the main question whether or not subjects engage in cross-task hedging in the
baseline treatment. We ﬁrst consider the number of subjects who choose cooperate in the role of
FM. If subjects do not hedge this number should be the same across treatments. Alternatively,
hedging provides an insurance against the risk of cooperation and, thus, subjects should be more
likely to cooperate as ﬁrst movers in Hedge than in NoHedge. Our data yields no evidence in favor
of hedging: there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the numbers of subjects who choose cooperate
(Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.999), and the minimal diﬀerence observed (17 in NoHedge versus 16 in
Hedge) actually runs counter the one predicted by the hedging hypothesis.
The second chief indicator for hedging is the belief about SM behavior stated by those who
choose cooperate in the role of FM. Figure 2 shows the histogram of guesses of aFM = c subjects.
If subjects do not hedge, then the beliefs stated by aFM = c subjects should not diﬀer between
treatments. If subjects do hedge, stated beliefs should be less optimistic in Hedge than in NoHedge.
13This eﬀect has been labeled “false consensus eﬀect” (Ross, Greene, and House 1977) in the social psychology
literature and is well established there (Mullen, Atkins, Champion, Edwards, Hardly, E., and Vanderklok 1985).
Dawes (1989) argues that the name is inappropriate, because the eﬀect can only be called “false” if subjects treat
their own choice diﬀerently from information about other subjects. Hence we use the term “consensus eﬀect”, following
Engelmann and Strobel (2000), who provide evidence from an experiment where beliefs are incentivized that there is
a consensus eﬀect, but no truly false consensus eﬀect.
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Figure 2: Histogram of beliefs about SM play stated by subjects choosing aFM = c
As can be seen from Table 3 and Figure 2, we ﬁnd no evidence for hedging. Those subjects choosing
aFM = c hold a mean belief of 6.13 (std. dev. = 1.75) in Hedge and 6.18 (1.42) in NoHedge. Stated
beliefs diﬀer neither according to a Mann-Whitney U test (two-sided, U = 131, p = 0.86), nor
according to a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Z = 0.380, p = 0.999). These ﬁndings hence
are consistent with the view that subjects do not hedge.14
As noted above, most subjects play a risk-neutral best response to their stated belief: 27 out
of 30 in Hedge and 23 out of 30 in NoHedge, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (Fisher’s exact test,
p = 0.300). If hedging actually mattered, participants in the Hedge treatment would bias downward
stated beliefs. This could make aFM = d the risk-neutral best response to stated beliefs in some
cases where aFM = c is played, and thus would predict a lower proportion of risk-neutral best
responses to stated beliefs in the Hedge treatment. Contrary to this hypothesis, there is not a single
14We note that the beliefs of subjects who defect as ﬁrst movers are also virtually identical in the two treatments,
2.64 in Hedge and 2.69 in NoHedge. This suggests that subjects are not more optimistic in NoHedge than in Hedge.
Thus we rule out as explanation for the absence of a treatment diﬀerence in FM cooperation that more optimism
(due to unobserved factors) in NoHedge pushes up FM cooperation to match that of Hedge and masks the impact of
hedging on FM cooperation.
13subject with such a pattern (those not playing a risk-neutral best response all involve a choice
aFM = d when aFM = c would be the risk-neutral best response to the stated belief).
There is only one bit in the experimental data that looks like hedging at ﬁrst glance. Four
subjects in Hedge choose (cooperate, 4), but only one chooses (defect, 4). Those subjects choosing
aFM = c could be risk averse, have a true belief of ﬁve or more and hedge risk by stating a belief of
four. In NoHedge, where such hedging is not possible, only two subjects choose (cooperate, 4) and
ﬁve choose (defect, 5). This higher share of (cooperate, 4) choices in Hedge could look like evidence
that some players are hedging. A closer look, however, suggests that this is just the outcome of
random factors unrelated to hedging. If subjects were indeed hedging we should see a decrease in
the average stated belief amongst all those choosing aFM = c relative to corresponding the average
in NoHedge. As discussed above, we do not ﬁnd this. Moreover, comparing the rates of aFM = c
and aFM = d choices among those subjects who state a belief of four, the diﬀerence between Hedge
and NoHedge is far from signiﬁcant (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.242).
As a ﬁnal piece of evidence, we note that in a post-experimental questionnaire no subject indi-
cated cross-task hedging. Half of the subjects answered to the question “Did you think about the
tasks one at a time or did you consider them jointly?” that they considered them jointly.15 However,
none of them elaborated in a way suggesting that they chose the beliefs in order to hedge against
the risks of FM cooperation, whereas several subjects discussed that FM cooperation is risky and
said that they stated a belief that was less extreme than their true belief because this was less risky.
Thus, several subjects point to within-task risk reduction, but none to across-task hedging.
4 Further Evidence Against Cross-Task Hedging: An Experiment
with a Financial Frame
Our sequential prisoners’ dilemma experiment suggests that experimental subjects do not make use
of cross-task hedging opportunities when they are asked for beliefs. In order to assess the robustness
of this result, we conducted another experiment where the opportunity for hedging is arguably easier
to recognize, and where parameters are such that incentives to hedge are strong.
15This question was aimed at revealing hedging because any subject who hedged should have been encouraged
to explain this when answering the verbal comment part of this question. There are, of course, reasons other than
hedging to consider the tasks jointly, most importantly to take the beliefs into account when making the FM choice.
144.1 Design and Procedures
To make hedging more natural, we additionally conducted the Finance experiment which has a ﬁ-
nancial investment frame that presents subjects with two individual decision problems. As explained
below, the ﬁrst resembles the structure of the FM choice in the sequential prisoners’ dilemma ex-
periment from Section 3, but with an exogenously given probability of SM cooperation; and the
second resembles the guess task. The parameter choice is such that hedging pays even for a small
degree of risk aversion.
Subjects make two decisions for which the payoﬀs depend on the performance of nine ﬁctitious
stocks. Each of these stocks has a probability of “performing well” of 51% and a probability of
“performing poorly” of 49%. The ﬁctitious stocks all move independently, and outcomes are based
on independent draws for each subject. The ﬁrst decision is whether or not to invest in one stock
that is randomly drawn from the basket of nine stocks (see Figure 3). If the subject chooses not
to invest in the stock (“the risk-free alternative investment”), she earns ECU 10 for sure. If she
chooses to invest in the stock and it performs well, she earns ECU 14; if the stock performs poorly,
she earns ECU 7. The second task is to guess how many of the nine stocks will perform well. The
payoﬀs depend on the guess and the true number of stocks that perform well in the same way as
in Table 1 for the guess task in the sequential prisoners’ dilemma experiment from Section 3. The
ﬁnal payoﬀ is the sum of the payoﬀs from both tasks, which is converted at a rate of £0.5 per ECU.
Note that the Finance experiment mirrors the structure of treatment Hedge for a situation where
each of the other participants is known to cooperate as SM with probability 51%. However, the
experiment introduces a number of diﬀerences to the Hedge treatment that are all aimed at making
the hedging opportunity more salient. First, choices are given a ﬁnancial investment frame. Second,
the exogenously given probabilities mean that there are no diﬀerences in subjects’ (true) beliefs here.
Third, abolishing any parallel to the SM decision turns this into an individual decision experiment
where strategic considerations or any other-regarding preferences cannot have an impact or distract
from the hedging opportunity. Fourth, subjects ﬁrst make the investment choice and then the guess,
which makes the opportunity to use the belief to hedge against the risk of the investment decision
more transparent.
The probabilities of 51% and 49% were chosen to make hedging pay even for a small degree of
risk aversion. Given this probability, the risk-neutral (as well as risk-seeking) optimal choices are to
invest in the ﬁrst decision and to guess that ﬁve out of nine stocks do well. However, for a subject
who chooses to invest, guessing that only four stocks will do well would reduce the variance of the
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Figure 4: Total payoﬀ (in ECU) for diﬀerent guesses given that investment in stock chosen
16total payoﬀ with only a very small loss in expected payoﬀ. Figure 4 illustrates this. Therefore,
subjects who are somewhat risk-averse and understand the hedging opportunities should invest and
state a belief of four (extremely risk-averse subjects should not invest and state ﬁve). Any subject
investing and stating a belief of four would hence be indicative of hedging. Naturally, this might
just be an error. But errors should occur in the other direction as well and also for those players
who do not invest. So we can compare the rate of (invest, 4) choices with that of (invest, 6) and
(not invest, 4) choices.16
For the Finance experiments we had 38 participants in three sessions. At the end of the experi-
ment, the ﬁnal payout in experimental currency units (ECU) was converted into Pounds Sterling at
an exchange rate of £0.5 per ECU. Average earnings were £12.09. Procedures otherwise followed
those for the sequential prisoners’ dilemma experiments in Section 3.2.
4.2 Results
Similar to the results for Hedge, we ﬁnd no evidence of hedging. As reported in Table 4, among the
25 subjects who choose to invest, only two subjects guess that four of the stocks would perform well.
While these two subjects could be hedging, we would rather attribute their guesses to errors. One
reason is that twice as many subjects guess that six stocks will do well, which can only be driven
by decision errors. Another reason is that among the 13 subjects who choose not to invest, an even
higher proportion (four subjects) guess that four stocks will do well (and three subjects guess that
six stocks will do well). So there is clear evidence of decision errors in the data. Intriguingly, the
error rate is higher among those who decide not to invest. But still there are no “big” errors: no
subject guesses less than four or more than six. As a ﬁnal piece of evidence, we note that one of the
two subjects who chose to invest and stated a belief of four – which would be consistent with the
hedging hypothesis – noted in the post-experimental questionnaire that she considered the choices
separately, whereas the other answered that she considered them jointly, without elaborating and
thus without giving unambiguous indication of hedging.
To summarize, while the design of the Finance experiment makes hedging possibilities salient
16The argument that, if subjects do not hedge, (invest, 4) and (not invest, 4) errors should be equally frequent is
based on the assumption that they consider the two decisions separately. In the hypothetical scenario that subjects
ﬁrst consider the most likely number of well-performing stocks and then decide whether they should invest in one
stock randomly drawn from these, risk averse subjects might prefer not to invest after wrongly inferring that the best
guess is four. The risk-neutral optimal choice, however, would still be to invest. Thus, if some players approach the
problem in this fashion, and err that four is the best guess, some should choose to invest.
17Guess
< 4 4 5 6 > 6 Σ
invest 0 2 19 4 0 25
not invest 0 4 6 3 0 13
Table 4: Results from Finance treatment.
relative to the Hedge belief elicitation treatment, it still provides no evidence of subjects under-
standing and making use of the hedging opportunities. The fact that about a third of the subjects
decide not to invest suggests that risk aversion indeed matters, and therefore the absence of hedging
cannot be explained as an artefact of a risk neutral subject pool.
The absence of hedging in our experiment is related to the under-diversiﬁcation puzzle doc-
umented in the ﬁnance literature. A prominent example is the equity home bias, reﬂecting the
fact that individuals tend to concentrate their investments in assets from their home country and
thus forgo diversiﬁcation opportunities (e.g., see the survey by Lewis 1999 and, for experimental
evidence, Fellner and Maciejovsky 2003). Another example is investment in own company stock.
For instance, Benartzi (2001) documents that Coca-Cola employees invested up to three-quarters
of their discretionary 401(k) pension contributions in Coca-Cola stock.
5 Conclusion
We presented experiments to test for a possible bias due to hedging in experiments where beliefs are
elicited and incentivized. The comparison between the Hedge and the NoHedge treatments suggests
no evidence whatsoever of cross-task hedging taking place. Neither do we ﬁnd more ﬁrst movers
cooperating in Hedge than in NoHedge, nor do stated beliefs diﬀer between treatments.
Obviously, we cannot conclude from our results that hedging is never a problem in experiments
with belief elicitation (empirical non-existence proofs are impossible). Our ﬁndings do, however,
support the presumption implicitly underlying previous belief elicitation experiments that cross-task
hedging is not a major problem. The additional Finance experiment with a ﬁnancial investment
frame suggests that hedging is unlikely to matter even in belief elicitation experiments where hedging
is more salient than in our sequential prisoners’ dilemma. In the Finance sessions, hedging should
be easier to understand and parameters are such that beneﬁts of hedging arise even for low risk
aversion — but we still ﬁnd no evidence for hedging. We concede that results might diﬀer under
18diverse conditions, for example for dramatically higher incentives or for diﬀerent (in particular
more sophisticated) subject pools. Also, subjects may learn to exploit hedging opportunities in
experiments with multiple periods if they receive feedback between periods. As the procedure we
propose for making a design “hedging proof” is very simple, it seems advisable to apply it at least
in such settings.
To summarize, we oﬀer two good pieces of news for researchers who want to elicit beliefs and
want to provide incentives for stating true beliefs. First, hedging does not appear to be a big
worry in simple one-shot experiments. Second, for those researchers who still worry about hedging
opportunities, we propose a very simple design that excludes theoretical risks of hedging across
belief elicitation tasks and other tasks: simply pay randomly either for the subjects’ actions or for
the stated beliefs, as in our NoHedge treatment.
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Appendix
A Instructions for the Belief Elicitation Experiments
You are now taking part in an experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, you
can, depending on your and other participants’ decisions, earn a considerable amount of money.
It is therefore important that you take your time to understand the instructions. Please do not
communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand and ask us. All the information you provide will be treated anonymously.
At the end of the experiment your earnings will be converted from Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) to Pounds Sterling at a rate of [Hedge: ECU 2 = £1/ NoHedge: ECU 1 = £1], and paid
to you in cash. Your earnings will also be treated conﬁdentially.
Situation underlying the experiment: We start by explaining the situation underlying the
experiment, which is represented in Figure 1 [corresponds to Figure 1 in this paper, but with the
23neutral frame labels]. There are two people involved, Person A and Person B. Person A can choose
between two options: IN or OUT. If Person A picks OUT, Person B has no choice to make, and
both Person A and B get ECU 10 each. If Person A picks IN, Person B then has a choice between
two options: LEFT or RIGHT. If LEFT is chosen, both Person A and B get ECU 14 each. If
RIGHT is chosen, Person A gets ECU 7 and Person B gets ECU 17.
Overview of the experiment: The experiment consists of three parts. You and the other
participants will each make decisions both in the role of Person A and of Person B. Additionally,
we will ask you to make a guess how the other participants in the room decided. At the end of
the experiment, the computer will randomly assign you either the role of Person A or the role of
Person B, and will also randomly match you and the other participants in pairs. Note that you will
have to make your decisions without knowing the role that you will ultimately be assigned. Also,
at the time when you make your decisions, you will not know the decision made by the participant
matched to you. Below, we will explain how your payment from the experiment is determined. But
let us ﬁrst have a closer look at your tasks in the order that they will appear.
1. Decision Task B: You have the role of Person B in the situation described in Figure 1. Given
that Person A chose IN: Do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
2. Guess Task: There are 10 participants in the room, you and 9 other participants. All of them
also did the above Decision Task B. How many of the 9 other participants do you think chose
LEFT?
3. Decision Task A: Now you have the role of Person A. Do you choose IN or OUT?
Payments: [Hedge: At the end of the experiment you will be paid both for the Decision Tasks
and for the Guess Task. Your overall payoﬀ will be converted at a rate of ECU 2 = £1. Payoﬀs
for the individual tasks are determined as follows.
Payoﬀ for the Decision Tasks: As mentioned,...]
[NoHedge: At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly decide whether your
payment will be based on the Decision Tasks or the Guess Task. Each type of tasks is equally likely
to be the one determining your payoﬀ, and will be the same for all subjects. (This means whenever
you are paid based on the Decision Tasks, also all other participants are paid based on the Decision
Tasks; and whenever you are paid for the Guess Task, this is also the case for all other participants.)
Your overall payoﬀ will be converted at a rate of ECU 1 = £1. Depending on the random draw of
the computer, payoﬀs are determined as follows.
24Payoﬀ if the random draw of the computer selects the Decision Tasks: As mentioned,] the com-
puter will randomly and anonymously pair you with another participant in the room. One of you
will randomly be assigned the role of Person A, and the other one will be assigned the role of Person
B. The computer will then take your and the other participant’s relevant Decision Task choices to
compute your payoﬀs as shown in Figure 1.
[Hedge: Payoﬀ for the Guess Task: In addition to the payoﬀ for the Decision Tasks, you receive
a payoﬀ for the Guess Task, which depends...]
[NoHedge: Payoﬀ if the random draw of the computer selects the Guess Task: The payoﬀ for
the Guess Task depends] on the accuracy of your guess. The better your guess, the higher will be
your payoﬀ. Take a look at Table 1 (on a separate page) [corresponds to Table 1 in this paper, but
with the neutral frame labels]. The table shows how your guess and the actual choices of the other
participants determine your payoﬀ.
• You can see that a perfect guess earns you ECU 15. For example, if your guess was 6, and if
there are actually 6 people who chose LEFT in Decision Task B, you get ECU 15.
• If your guess is completely oﬀ the mark you earn nothing. This occurs if you guess that 9
other participants chose LEFT, while none of them did so; or if you guess that none of the
other participants chose LEFT, while all of them did so.
• Otherwise, your payoﬀ depends on how close to accurate your guess was. For example, if 6
out of the other 9 participants chose LEFT, and your guess was that 3 participants would do
so, you earn ECU 13.30.
Before starting with the actual experiment, we will ask you to answer a few control questions. Then
we will go through the three parts of the experiment. There will be plenty of time before each
decision to ask questions. At the end of the experiment we ask you to answer a few questions.
These answers will not aﬀect your ﬁnal payment.
Are there any questions? If so, please raise your hand.
B Oral Summaries for the Belief Elicitation Experiments
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not communicate with the other participants during the
experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask us. At your seat you will
ﬁnd a set of instructions. Read them carefully now. Please answer the questions you ﬁnd on a
25separate page and raise your hand if you are ﬁnished. Before the experiment starts we will give a
brief summary.
After instructions were read, before Decision Task B: To summarize: Please look at Figure 1
in the instructions. The experiment starts with Decision Task B. Next will be the Guess Task,
and ﬁnally we come to Decision Task A. You will have to do each task only once. We will brieﬂy
summarize the tasks when we get to them.
[NoHedge: At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly decide for all participants
whether the Decision Tasks are going to be the basis for payments, or the Guess task.]
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly matches you with one of the other partic-
ipants in the room. One of you will be assigned the role of Person A and the other that of Person B
— both roles are equally likely. [Hedge: The payoﬀs for the Decision Tasks will then be computed
based on your and the other participant’s choices in the relevant Decision Tasks. In addition, the
Guess task will be paid. The whole amount will then be converted to Pounds Sterling at a rate of
ECU 2 = £1/ NoHedge: If the Decision tasks will be the basis for payments, the payoﬀs will then
be computed based on your and the other participant’s choices in the relevant Decision tasks. Oth-
erwise, the Guess task will be paid. The payoﬀ amount will then be converted to Pounds Sterling
at a rate of ECU 1 = £1.]
We start with Decision Task B. You are asked to make a choice between LEFT and RIGHT for
the case that you are assigned the role of Person B and Person A chose IN before. If you choose
LEFT, both you and the other participant matched to you will get ECU 14. If you choose RIGHT,
you get ECU 17 and the other participant ECU 7. Note that you will learn your actual role only
at the end of the experiment. Also, if you actually are assigned the role of Person B you will learn
Person A’s actual choice only at the end of the experiment. [NoHedge: You will also learn only at
the end of the experiment whether the Decision Tasks or the Guess Task will determine the payoﬀs.]
Are there any questions?
Between Decision Task B and Guess Task: We now come to the Guess Task. You are asked to
guess how many of the 9 other participants in the room chose LEFT in the Decision Task B. Have a
look at Table 1. It shows how your guess and the actual choices of the other participants determine
your payoﬀ. Also, go through the examples given in the instructions (p.3 bottom).
Are there any questions?
Between Guess Task and Decision Task A: We now come to Decision Task A. You are asked to
make a choice between IN and OUT for the case that you are assigned the role of Person A. If you
choose IN, your payoﬀ and that of the other participant matched to you in the role of Person B
26depend on the choice between LEFT and RIGHT of that participant, as described in Figure 1. If
you choose OUT, both of you receive ECU 10, and the choice of the other participant matched to
you is irrelevant for payoﬀs. Again, you learn your actual role only at the end of the experiment.
Are there any questions?
C Instructions for the Experiment with a Financial Frame
You are now ... treated conﬁdentially [as in instructions for belief elicitation experiments (Appendix
A), with exchange rate ECU 2 = £1.]
Overview of the experiment: During the experiment you will make two investment decisions
and your ﬁnal earnings will depend on the sum of payoﬀs from both decisions. These decisions are
related to a basket of 9 stocks from diﬀerent sectors (a stock is an ownership share in a company).
For each of these stocks there is a 51% probability that it will end up having a high value (i.e.
the company does well), and a 49% probability that it will end up having a low value (i.e. the
company does poorly). The sectors and thus the stocks’ values are independent of each other. This
means that the direction of the move in value for each stock is determined by a random draw that
is made independently from that for the other stocks in the basket. In this experiment there is no
interaction with other participants and the performance of stocks is determined separately by the
computer for each participant. We now explain the ﬁrst investment decision.
Investment Decision A: You choose between holding one randomly selected stock from the basket
of 9 stocks described above and holding a risk-free alternative investment, unrelated to the stocks.
If you choose to hold the risk-free alternative investment, your payoﬀ from investment decision A
will be ECU 10 for sure. If you choose to hold instead the stock, then there is a 51% probability
that its value will be high (because this is true for each of the 9 stocks from which this stock is
drawn). In this case your payoﬀ from Investment Decision A will be ECU 14. And there is a 49%
probability that the value of the stock will be low. Then your payoﬀ from Investment Decision A
will be ECU 7. That is, you have a chance of gaining ECU 4 relative to the risk-free alternative
investment with slightly more than a 1 out of 2 chance and losing ECU 3 with a slightly less than
1 out of 2 chance. Figure 1 illustrates this [corresponds to Figure 3 in paper]. We now come to the
second investment decision.
Investment Decision B: Investment Decision B is a “bet on the market”. Its payoﬀ depends on
the performance of the basket of 9 stocks described above (including the stock from Investment
Decision A) and your guess. As explained above, for each of the 9 stocks there is a 51% probability
27that it will have a high value and a 49% probability that it will have a low value. All 9 stocks move
independently from each other, as the sectors they belong to are unrelated to each other. Thus,
for example, if a stock in one sector has high value this does not inﬂuence the chances of the other
stocks having high value.
Your payoﬀ for Investment Decision B depends on two things: (i) your guess of the number of
stocks that will have high value; (ii) the actual number of stocks having high value. Take a look
at Table 1 (on a separate page) [corresponds to Table 1 in this paper, but with the ﬁnance frame
labels], which shows how the payoﬀ depends on your guess and the actual number of stocks having
high value.
• You can see that a perfect match between your guess and the actual number of stocks having
high value earns you ECU 15. For example, if your guess was 6, and 6 out of the 9 stocks
have high value, you get ECU 15.
• You earn nothing if your guess was 9 and none of the stocks have high value, or if your guess
0 and all of the stocks have high value.
• Otherwise, your payoﬀ depends on how close your guess is to the actual number of stocks
having high value. For example, if 6 out of the 9 stocks have high value, and your guess was
3, you earn ECU 13.30.
Remember that the stock that you can invest in for Investment Decision A is randomly drawn
from the basket of 9 stocks relevant for Investment Decision B. Thus, the more of the 9 stocks do
well, the more likely it is that the stock in investment Decision A is among those that do well. For
example, if all 9 stocks have high value, the value of the stock from Investment decision A will also
be high. If all 9 stocks have low value, the value of the stock from Investment decision A will also
be low.
Payments: At the end of the experiment your earnings from Investment Decision A and Invest-
ment Decision B will be added together and converted at a rate of ECU 2 = £1.
Before starting with the actual experiment... [as in instructions for belief elicitation experiments
(Appendix A)].
D Oral Summary for the Experiment with a Financial Frame
[First part as in oral summaries for belief elicitation experiments (Appendix B).]
28After instructions were read, before Investment Decision A: To summarize: The experiment
starts with Investment Decision A. Next will be Investment Decision B. We will brieﬂy summarize
the tasks when we get to them. You will have to do each task only once. Your payoﬀ for the
experiment will be the sum of payoﬀs from both Investment decisions. The whole amount will then
be converted to Pounds Sterling at a rate of ECU 2 = £1.
In this experiment there is no interaction with other participants and the performance of stocks
is determined separately by the computer for each participant.
The computer will randomly determine for each stock whether it has high or low value. All
9 stocks move independently from each other, as the sectors they belong to are unrelated to each
other. Thus, for example, if a stock in one sector has high value this does not inﬂuence the chances of
the other stocks having high value. One of the 9 stocks is randomly chosen for Investment Decision
A, to which we now turn. Please look at Figure 1 in the instructions. If you choose to hold the
risk-free alternative investment, your payoﬀ from investment decision A will be ECU 10 for sure. If
you choose to hold instead the stock, then there is a 51% probability that its value will be high. In
this case your payoﬀ from Investment Decision A will be ECU 14. And there is a 49% probability
that the value of the stock will be low. Then your payoﬀ from Investment Decision A will be ECU
7. That is, you have a chance of gaining ECU 4 relative to the risk-free alternative investment with
slightly more than a 1 out of 2 chance and losing ECU 3 with a slightly less than 1 out of 2 chance.
Are there any questions?
Between Investment Decisions A and B: We now come to Investment Decision B. You are asked
to guess how many of the 9 stocks in the basket do well. Have a look at Table 1. It shows how
your guess and the actual number of stocks doing well determine your payoﬀ. Also, go through the
examples given in the instructions (p.3 bottom)
Are there any questions?
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